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Abstract
In this paper we compare the suitability of several marketbased allo
cation mechanisms the Vickrey auction the matrix auction for multiple
heterogeneous items and the simulated trading algorithm using the alloca
tion of transportation tasks to a eet of trucks as an example domain
We distinguish three dierent organizational settings in which the set
of vehicles represented by autonomous agents may be coordinated by the
examined marketbased mechanisms in a cooperative setting the truck
agents are benevolent and try to reduce transportation cost on behalf of a
central coordinator ie an agent that represents the shipping company In
a competitive setting the truck agents are selfinterested and aim at opti
mizing their private surplus In the hybrid setting a compromise between
the conicting goals cost minimization and surplus maximization has to
be found
We analyze the communication complexity of the mechanisms on a
theoretical basis We empirically examine their scalability and tractability
by comparing their processing time and allocative eciency for order sets
of dierent size Thereby the allocative eciency of the mechanisms is
measured in terms of cost surplus and number of trucks The results are
rated from the point of view of the dierent organizational settings
  Introduction
Auctionbased market mechanisms are nowadays discussed for establishing virtual
marketplaces in the growing area of ecommerce For instance these mechanisms
can be applied for establishing networks of cooperating forwarding companies
In the highly competitive haulage business small and medium sized shipping rms
that operate locally are often forced to form temporary interregional cooperative
networks in order to bundle their resources and to establish competitive prices

Since the partners in such a network are selfinterested ie they rate their own
prot higher than the overall prot of the network the network faces the freerider
problem that participants might try to take advantage of the group by betraying
each other Hence a group of forwarders that try to optimize their own local
prot by lying about their true valuations risks to end up with a suboptimal
global solution Such an untruthful behavior decreases the competitive power of
such a network and endangers its existence
An approach to overcome this dilemma is the usage of truth revealing
Ma et al 		
 allocation mechanisms ie mechanisms that are designed so that
the best strategy for the bidders is to reveal their true preferences to the coor
dinator a trusted individual within the network that coordinates the allocation
process
The most common truth revealing mechanism is the Vickrey auction Vickrey 

where the bidders submit one sealed bid for a single item which is granted to the
highest bid for the price of the second highest bid This principle the Vickrey
principle enforces that neither bidding higher nor bidding lower then the true
valuation is benecial
In their daily business forwarders are faced with high dynamics and are
often forced to manage multiple tasks in parallel The matrix auction
Gomber et al 	
 allows to assign multiple tasks to a group of bidders in an
truthrevealing fashion
If the conditions in the network is less competitive eg if the participating for
warders are subsidiaries of one company the problem of selshness is less dra
matic In this case mechanisms that allow global cost minimization can be ap
plied We examine the simulated trading algorithm Bachem et al 
 that sim
ulates a dynamic market mechanism under central control Nevertheless in this
setting the matrix and Vickrey auctions are also applicable hence we compare
them with the simulated trading procedure
Besides these pure settings we have also to take into consideration that in reality
there exist intermediate cases between competitive and cooperative settings eg
networks with strong internal commitments ensuring that local and global utilities
can be distinguished only up to a certain extend The usefulness of a mechanism
depends on the degree of autonomy of the networks participants
In this paper we analyze the communication complexity of the mechanisms which
is the amount of information in terms of sent messages exchanged by the agents
in dependence of the number of bidders and tasks Furthermore we empirically
examine their scalability and tractability by comparing their processing time
and allocative eciency for order sets of dierent size Thereby the allocative
eciency of the mechanisms is measured in terms of cost surplus and number of
trucks The results are rated from the point of view of the dierent organizational
settings
We have implemented and evaluated the above mechanisms on the basis of the
MASMARS scheduling system Fischer et al 
 for vehicle routing problems
The simulated trading procedure has already been incorporated in MASMARS as
an optimization procedure for preexisting solutions For our purpose we extended
the algorithm for the allocation of new tasks during an optimization process
Figure  is a screen shot of MASMARS executing a clustered benchmark

Figure  A MASMARS Screen Shot
For our evaluation we use the benchmarks generated by Solomon for the vehi
cle routing problem with time windows Solomon 	
 The work presented in our
paper focuses on a dierent issue from Fischer et al Fischer et al 
 who ex
amined the performance of simulated trading as an optimization procedure for
a preexisting allocation and were able to prove that the results obtained by
simulated trading can compete with central OR techniques
The paper is organized as follows In the next section we explain the allocation
mechanisms underlying the protocols in use In Section  the complexity of the
allocation mechanisms is analyzed In Section  we present the results of our
test runs and compare the performance of the dierent allocation mechanisms for
the dierent settings Finally we conclude and point to future work

 MarketBased Allocation Mechanisms
In this section we briey introduce the marketbased mechanisms used in the
evaluation A detailed description can be found in Fischer et al 	

The Vickrey auction and the matrix auction mechanisms base on the Vickrey
principle and hence are truthrevealing these marketbased mechanisms force
even selfinterested bidders to truthfully reveal their valuations for the anounced
items Because of this revelation property they are wellsuited to generate cost
ecient allocations in competitive settings where the interacting forwarders are
selfinterested
In contrast to these mechanisms the simulated trading algorithm is not a pure
allocation mechanism but combines the allocation of new items with the opti
mization of the existing allocation which initially can be empty Simulated
trading is only suited for cooperative settings in which complete information
about the participants valuations is available Therefore simulated trading is
only applicable to the optimization of benevolent truthtelling forwarders that
do not hide private information
  Vickrey Auction
In the sealedbid secondprice or Vickrey auction VA every bidder submits a
sealed bid for the item to be auctioned o to the auctioneer In contrast to the
sealedbid rstprice auction in the Vickrey auction the bidder who submitted
the best bid receives the item for the second highest bid made This procedure
achieves that a bidder whose bid exceeds his true valuation risks to be granted
for this item at a price that exceeds the valuation as well On the other hand
stating a bid lower than the true valuation might cause the rejection In both
cases a bidder cannot inuence the price he has to pay
Vickrey showed formally that in a sealedbid secondprice auction for symmetric
riskneutral bidders it is a dominant strategy to reveal their true cost or values
Vickrey 
 ie truthrevealing strategies are not only equilibrium strategies but
also dominant
   Matrix Auctions
Matrix auctions MA Gomber et al 	
 are applicable for the simultaneous as
signment of multiple items or tasks to bidders The valuation of a set of items
can dier signicantly from the sum of the valuations of each single item For
instance this may be the case if the items to be allocated reect tasks
 
 The
auctioneer announces in a matrixkauction MAk the k oered items to the
bidders that in turn calculate their valuations for each potential combination of
items hence the bidders have to compute 
k
   valuations and report them
to the auctioneer From the transmitted bids or reported valuations of the bid
ders the auctioneer sets up a matrix where the cells represent the bids for each
 
Performing tasks is resource consuming and therefore may result in a loss of utility which
can be reected by a negative bid Negative bids are explicitly allowed in a matrix auction
They are useful if a set of tasks has to be completely performed by a group of agents

combination of items Using that matrix the auctioneer identies the optimal
allocation of all k items The price for each assigned subset of items equals the
secondhighest bid in the matrix column for that set of items This Vickrey pric
ing assures that the bidders reveal their true valuations because the bid as the
revelation of a bidders valuation for an item does determine if he gets awarded
the item but does not inuence the price he has to pay for it
  Simulated Trading
Simulated trading Bachem et al 
 is a randomized algorithm that realizes a
market mechanism where the participating contractors optimize a task allocation
by successively selling and buying tasks Trading is done in several rounds each
of which consists of a number of decision cycles In each cycle the participants
submit one oer to sell or buy a task At the end of each round the stock
manager the central coordinating instance matches the sell and buy oers of
the contractors and informs them about the match The stock manager tries to
match the oers in such a way that the costs of the global solution decrease
This implements a kind of hillclimbing algorithm Like in simulated annealing
a derivation that decreases from round to round can be specied in early rounds
the stock manager is willing to accept a worsening of the global solution which is
helpful to leave local maxima in the solution space Nevertheless maxima that
are left are saved so that the best solution found up to this point in time can
be returned if the algorithm terminates before a better solution is found Hence
simulated trading is an interruptible anytime algorithm
Originally simulated trading was designed to improve an initial allocation For
our purpose we have extended the simulated trading algorithm such that an
existing allocation is not required but can be generated during the trading process
To do so we have allowed the stock manager to state oers to sell tasks to the
participants and we have changed the matching procedure such that these oers
are matched with priority regardless that the costs of the solution increase
 Theoretical Analysis of the Mechanisms
Communication Complexity
In this section we investigate the communication complexities for agentbased
implementations of the mechanisms described in Section  where the roles of
the auctions participants are taken by autonomous agents We examine how the
complexity of agent communication depends on the number n of agents and the
number k of tasks to be allocated in the system
Agent communication turns out to be a good performance indicator because in
physically distributed domains such as the transport domain opening and using
communication channels have shown to be very important limiting factors As a
measurement we do not use the simple amount of communication acts but the
overall number of communication primitives an act consists of For the complexity
analysis the decomposition of communication acts in primitives is sucient since

we regard that the amount of information ie the number of transmitted bits
to be bounded
Estimating computational complexity only would be insucient because the com
plexity of a computation an agent has to perform does not always have to eect
the performance of another agent and the overall performance in a distributed
system
We now discuss communication complexity of the above introduced communica
tion protocols Vickrey auction matrix auctions and simulated trading For the
sake of independence of the underlying computational model we assume that
agent communication is only possible in a pointtopoint fashion Hence in this
model broadcast communication can only be realized by sequentially sending
messages to communication partners Assuming that the eort for sending mes
sages equals the eort for receiving them the possibility of broadcasting messages
reduces the total eort for communication at most with the constant factor 
since the eort for receiving broadcasts remains
 The Vickrey Auction
During a Vickrey auction the following communication acts are sent a manager
sends bid requests for a certain good or order to all bidders who reply with their
bids Then the manager selects an appropriate partner conrms the assignment
of the order to this partner and sends rejects to all other bidders Let n be the
number of communicating agents According to the pointtopoint communica
tion assumption n requests each of which consisting of one communication
primitive are made followed by n bids one conrmation and n rejects
all consisting of one communication primitive Hence the Vickrey auction has
communication complexity ofOn in terms of the number of participating agents
  The Matrix Auctions
In the matrix auction the auctioneer announces k items to n    agents Ok 
n The bidders submit an oer for each of the 
k
   subsets of the item
set this corresponds to one communication act consisting of 
k
   primitives
O
k
n After computing the optimal allocation the auctioneer needs n  
messages to inform the bidders about the nal allocation On This leads to an
overall communication complexity of O
k
 n This result and the exponential
computational complexity of the allocation procedure enforce small k After
xing a suciently small k a communication complexity of On remains with
a possibly high constant depending on k As we will see in Section  k   is
tractable even for large n while k   is not tractable for n  
 Simulated Trading
A trading round within the simulated trading process described in Section 
consists of a xed number of l decision levels At each level every contractor
may announce a selling request or place a buying bid to the stock manager
The stock manager has to inform all contractors of received selling requests

Again let n be the number of agents participating in the negotiation In the
buyingselling announcement phase of each level n    communication acts are
performed In the information phase the stock manager has to send at most
n    messages Such a message may contain at most n    oers which are
communication primitives Hence the complexity of one trading round is Ol 
n

 Since l is xed in advance and hence can be treated as constant the
communication complexity for simulated trading is On


The stock managers task to process the trading graph which is known to be
NPhard does not inuence communication complexity
Summary From a theoretical point of view all protocols have linear or at most
squared complexity in terms of communication primitives Speaking in practi
cal terms if only few agents take part in one of the marketbased mechanisms
described above no communication bottlenecks arise which enables a good scal
ability of the mechanisms in terms of communication load
However if further processing is dependent on the nal outcome of the negotia
tion the measure of communication primitives is insucient For these reasons
we provide an empirical scalability evaluation of the mechanisms in the next sec
tion in which we examine the processing time and the overall allocative eciency
of the marketbased mechanisms
 Empirical Evaluation
In this section we analyze the performance of the matrix auctions MAk where
k  f  g orders are assigned simultaneously in comparison with the Vickrey
auction and the simulated trading algorithm using the transportation domain as
a testbed Three major aspects are of concern
 Tractability is the algorithm suitable in terms of processing time	 We have
shown in the previous section that the complexity of the protocols in use
is at the most squared in terms of number of communication primitives
However the actual computing time is for some of the agents exponential
If other agents have to delay their actions until the task allocation process
has been completed processing time can be a critical issue for the usefulness
of a mechanism
 E
ciency Which method leads to the most e
cient results	 Obviously
this issue depends on the chosen setting
 A cooperative company in this setting the auctioneer agent represents
the company and tries to minimize the overall cost per order The
forwarders represented by truck agents have no interest in optimizing
their individual prots
 A competitive situation where the auctioneer does not optimize his
or her prot and truck agents represent independent forwarders eg
drivers working as freelances and optimizing their surplus per or
der

 A scenario where all auctioneer and truck agents are rewarded In
such a case the auctioneer tries to minimize the overall payments
per order which is the sum of the costs and the forwarders surplus
while the truck agents try to maximize their individual surplus
 Number of trucks Since the size of the truck eet is an important cost
factor for a shipping company we investigate how many trucks are needed
using the dierent marketbased mechanisms
 The Analyzed Problem Classes
For our evaluation we use the benchmarks Solomon generated for the vehicle
routing problem with time windows Solomon 	
 Those data build up on a
set of problems that Christodes et al Christodes et al 
 developed for the
vehicle routing problem without time constraints
Solomons benchmarks include six dierent data sets of transportation orders
that have distinct characteristics concerning geometry number of destinations
and time constraints In particular we distinguish between clustered several
groups of clients lie closely together and nonclustered settings
For our test runs we have averaged over three single problems

 We have chosen
to analyze the system outcomes for maximally clustered test data test set  fc
 c  c g and completely nonclustered test data test set  fr  r
 r g In contrast to the original setting where the subordinate trucks are
initially located at a central depot we have distributed the initial position of the
trucks over the map since we take also into account the setting where the trucks
are independent forwarders
Figure  Number of granted trucks
Prior to the run of an experiment the number of initial trucks in the system
has to be specied This number increases automatically if the tasks cannot be

The use of only three problems was sucient since tests with more problems showed that
the variation of results were considerably small
	
allocated to the trucks currently available Starting with a large amount of trucks
may be advantageous since their initial position is randomly distributed leading
to a rather high chance that the task to be announced is situated closely On the
other hand the task allocation procedure takes more time for a large number of
trucks In our experiment we have run every test twice one time starting with
two trucks initially and one time starting with the amount of trucks m needed in
the test run started with  initial trucks up to a maximum of  initial trucks
In order to examine scalability we have run combinations of test sets for 
    and  orders

 leading to a total number of  test runs
The experiments have been performed using the MASMARS system which is
implemented in Oz running on a  MHz Dual Pentium II PC with  MB
RAM under Linux The results of the experiments are listed in the apendix
  Results
Number of trucks The number of truck agent being the base for our theo
retical complexity analysis depends on the size of the order set It is increased
dynamically whenever the present number of trucks is not sucient for the plan
ning of the task at hand
As stated above the number of used trucks can also inuence the choice of the
mechanism since the truck eet produces also maintenance costs a shipping com
pany has to minimize However the use of dierent protocols leads to roughly
the same number of trucks in action Figure  MA uses slightly less trucks
than the other mechanisms
Figure  Run Time

For the latter order set we enlarged Solomons original benchmarks

Tractability We have measured the run time of the various protocols for dif
ferent number of orders Here and in the following we average over quantities
that are out of focus For this examination we have averaged over  results from
clustered and nonclustered data sets stemming from two or m initial trucks
Figure  shows the results up to a maximum running time of  minutes The
gure does not contain all results from MA and MA since this would reduce
the expressiveness of the gure The Vickrey auction performs quite well while
the matrix auctions running time is growing very fast with an increasing number
of orders While the Vickrey mechanism could allocate  orders in  seconds
the test runs of MA with  orders took about  minutes and MA with 
orders took more than  hours each Tractability is no longer fullled in such
cases
Performance dierences between clustered and nonclustered data sets were sig
nicant only for MA and MA with high numbers of orders In extreme cases
processing nonclustered orders took up to  times longer than clustered ones
Similarly starting with two initial trucks only outperformed starting with m ini
tial trucks at MA and MA with high numbers of orders in a signicant fashion
In all other cases no signicant dierence could be found
Figure  Overall cost per order
Figure  Overall cost per order for nonclustered and clustered settings

As the theoretical analysis has already indicated the runtime of the MA and
MA are intractable for large sets of orders while the others can be rated as
tractable
Eciency for the cooperative setting As stated above for such a setting
cost per order is the crucial issue Figure  shows the overall results
Generally speaking all protocols show rather similar results However the sim
ulated trading procedure is proved to be most ecient for large order sets where
much optimization can be done MA and MA perform slightly better than
the remaining protocols Hence ST would be the protocol of choice for the auc
tioneer Comparing the settings with  and m initial trucks no major dierence
could be found the mtruck setting performs slightly better
Interesting though is the discrepancy between clustered and nonclustered set
tings Figure  Generally speaking the costs for the performance of clustered
task sets are lower than in the nonclustered setting since trucks mostly act
within one cluster This eect vanishes for large order sets
Figure  Overall surplus per order
Figure  Overall surplus per order for nonclustered and clustered settings

In the case of clustered orders simulated trading looses its advantages over the
matrix auctions in such settings MA and MA outperform the other mecha
nisms mainly for tasks of  and more orders This matches the intuition that it
is cost ecient to allocate bundled tasks in clusters
Eciency for the competitive setting In a setting where only trucks op
timize their benet their individual surplus has to be compared Figure  In
this setting and in the hybrid one Simulated trading is not applicable because it
requires cooperative agents
MA outperforms dominantly all other mechanisms followed by the Vickrey
auction Figure  shows dierences between nonclustered and clustered cases
for clustered cases the Vickrey auction performs almost as well as MA which
is not the case in the nonclustered case In general surplus in the nonclustered
case is roughly independent of the number of trucks which again is not true for
the clustered case
Figure 	 Payment for  orders
Eciency for the hybrid setting In a setting where all auctioneer and
truck agents compete for prot both surplus and cost have to be taken into
account since truck agents strive to maximize surplus while the auctioneer tries
to minimize the overall payments ie the sum of cost and surplus The goals of
auctioneer and bidders conict hence the protocol to be chosen then depends
on the inuence or power of the auction participants
However costs do not vary signicantly as Figure 	 shows for a representative
example where  orders were processed starting with m   initial trucks
Hence the expected surplus will determine the common choice which is MA
in the case that the auctioneer is dominant and MA if the truck agents are
dominant

 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a theoretical complexity analysis of several
marketbased mechanisms for task allocation in terms of communication acts
The various mechanisms have been implemented and empirically evaluated in
the domain of vehicle routing For this purpose the mechanisms have been inte
grated into the MASMARS system for eet scheduling which oers convenient
opportunities for testing their allocative eciency
ST VA MA and MA can be rated as scalable while MA and for large
order sets MA do not provide better results but loose tractability indicating
that matrix auctions where six or even more items are traded in parallel are not
expected to be particularly ecient
In the cooperative setting the simulated trading procedure produces generally the
best results with tractable eort Nevertheless MA achieves acceptable results
as well The MA procedure ensures a maximal payo for the selfinterested
forwarders In the hybrid setting the VA or various matrix auctions can be taken
into consideration depending on the character of the compromise found between
global and local interests
Currently at DFKI a system for practical eet scheduling is being developed in
close cooperation with a transportation company Burckert et al 	
 This sys
tem will be extended to enable colaboration between dierent companies within
a cooperative network
In future work we will extend the MASMARS system with leveled commitment
allocation procedures to allow the truck agents to decommit from previously
made allocation decisions Furthermore we will investigate whether the presented
results can be transfered to other application domains and how the proposed
mechanisms can be used eg for the coordination of virtual marketplaces and the
formation and operation of virtual enterprises
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Results of the Simulated Trading
 initial trucks n initial trucks
no order run no run no
orders set time trucks cost time trucks cost
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